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Purpose:  The main purpose is to see if dividend smoothing is a pertinent 
phenomenon among Swedish public firms. The study also aims to 
identify what firm characteristics that drive dividend smoothing. 
Theoretical Framework: The theoretical framework covers different explanations of 
dividend smoothing behavior, such as information asymmetries, 
agency issues and investor clientele motivations. Also, share 
repurchases are given as an explanation of dividend smoothing 
behavior.  
Empirical Foundation: The study covers firms listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, that 
have been paying dividends every single year during the period of 
2001-2012, or for as long as the company has been listed, for a 
minimum of 7 years. 85 companies are making the cut. 
Methodology:  Quantitative approach using Lintner’s partial adjustment model as 
well as multiple regression analyses. 
Conclusion:  Dividend smoothing seems to be an occurring phenomena among 
Swedish public firms. The results of this study mainly support 
agency theory as being a determining factor of dividend 
smoothing, while there is no support for information asymmetry 
and investor clientele motivations. Further, firms that repurchase 
shares seem to be more likely to smooth their dividends than other 
firms.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, background and problem discussion is presented in order to motivate the purpose and research 
questions displayed. Thereafter delimitations and a short description of the thesis outline are provided. 
 
1.1 The dividend debate 
 
“Do you know the only thing that gives me pleasure? It’s to see my dividends coming in” 
- John D. Rockefeller1. 
 
There is usually a large buzz and sometimes a bit of controversy whenever a firm initiates, raises, 
or lowers its dividends. Even though large investments made by a firm have potential to create 
great value, dividends that are merely a distribution of cash to its shareholders tend to get similar 
attention in the media. Even though there is a large debate regarding dividends and whether firms 
even should use dividends, as they have their share of drawbacks, people tend to like and take an 
interest in them like few other aspects in the business world does. 
 
Dividends have for a long time been a subject that has puzzled researchers in the field of 
corporate finance. Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued in their dividend irrelevance theory that, 
in a perfect market, it does not matter whether a firm pays out dividends or not. They argue that 
as long as paying dividends does not interfere with the investment policy it should not affect firm 
value. Thus, the firm’s payout policy should be irrelevant.  However, in the real world there are 
no perfect markets and empirical studies show that dividend policy do matter.  
 
In contrast to Miller and Modigliani, other economists have found dividends being useful in 
many different ways. Jensen (1986) argues that dividends can be used to mitigate agency issues 
related to the free cash flow of the firm. There are also theories stating that investors and other 
market participants view dividends as a signaling tool that can convey insider information about 
the firm’s future performance (Ogden, Jen, and O’Connor, 2002). Therefore it is believed that 
dividends can mitigate information asymmetry problems as well. Allen, Bernardo and Welch 
(1999) argue that firms pay dividends to attract certain types of investors.  
 
                                                          
1
 Quote retrieved from Forbes.com (http://www.forbes.com/sites/greggfisher/2012/09/13/the-mystery-behind-
dividend-yield-investing/) [2014-05-26]. 
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Empirical studies like Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) show that the market punishes 
cuts in dividends way more severely than they reward dividend raises. Brav, Graham, Harvey, and 
Michaely (2005) argue that this is one of the reasons to why dividends are sticky. On the other 
hand, Ogden et al. (2002) argue that since a firm’s financing needs vary over time, so should its 
dividends. In reality, this seems to be far from the truth.  
 
1.2 Prior studies: Dividend smoothing 
The phenomenon of dividend smoothing was first documented in the study of Lintner in the 
mid-1950s. Lintner (1956) concluded that dividends were quite stable over time and that firms in 
the US were reluctant to increase their dividends unless they could see permanent increases in 
earnings. His study also demonstrated that firms are even less likely to cut dividends even when 
earnings drop. In this sense, dividends tend to increase steadily over time and also tend to be 
smoothed in relation to earnings, in order to maintain a certain target payout ratio. Even though 
more than a half-century has passed since Lintner’s observations, his partial adjustment model is 
still very commonly used to measure the smoothing behavior of firms (e.g. Andres, Betzer, 
Goergen, and Renneboog, 2009; Chemmanur, He, Hu, and Liu, 2010; Leary and Michaely, 2011; 
Jeong, 2013). 
 
Many studies focus on identifying the existence of dividend smoothing (Allen et al., 1999;  
Al-Yahyaee, Pham, and Walter, 2010) and make international comparisons (Chemmanur et al. 
2010; Jeong, 2013). Only a few articles try to map the determining factors behind it. Chemmanur 
et al. (2010) argue that dividend smoothing is more common in the US compared to Hong Kong 
mainly due to tax differences between the two countries. Chemmanur et al. (2010) seem to find 
support for the signaling motive of dividend smoothing in both countries, however the signaling 
effects are stronger in the US since signaling is more costly in the US due to higher taxes on 
dividends. Jeong (2013) on the other hand, finds that in South Korea, it is not agency problems 
nor information asymmetries that cause firms to smooth dividends, but rather the institutional 
factors of the financial market, such as the interest rate level and tax rate. 
  
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) provide support that agency problems are 
a strong reason for why firms choose to pay dividends. Leary and Michaely (2011) find 
something similar regarding dividend smoothing. They map the determinants of why US firms 
smooth their dividends. Their study emanate from different theoretical explanations of dividend 
policies, namely from asymmetric information, agency problems and dividend clientele motives. 
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In line with La Porta et al. (2000) they find that agency problems seem to be a reason for why 
firms employ dividend smoothing, whereas information asymmetry and tax clienteles does not 
seem to explain dividend smoothing. This goes against what Chemmanur et al. (2010) found; that 
the signaling element of dividends had an impact on a firm’s smoothing behavior. 
 
This paper is going to investigate the determining factors of dividend smoothing behavior in 
Swedish firms. This is interesting because not too many studies on determinants of dividend 
smoothing has concerned non-US material. Also, studies have shown that international 
differences exist in terms of degree of dividend smoothing (e.g. Al-Yahyaee et al., 2010; 
Chemmanur et al., 2010; and Jeong, 2013) and therefore it is plausible to assume that Swedish 
firms can showcase a somewhat different dividend smoothing behavior. 
 
La Porta et al. (2000) found that firms based in countries with higher shareholder protection also 
pay higher dividends. They argue that common law countries such as the US and the UK are 
more likely to pay higher dividends than civil law countries such as Sweden, Germany, and 
France. Leary and Michaely (2011) highlight the relationship between the levels in dividend 
payout and the degree of smoothing. They find that firms that pay higher degrees of dividends 
also smooth their dividends more. Thus, it can also be expected that Swedish firms are 
smoothing their dividends to a lesser extent than US firms.  
 
Further, Sweden is one of few developed countries where essentially all of the companies pay 
yearly dividends (Ferris, Noronha, and Unlu, 2009), whereas US companies are on the other 
extreme where almost all companies are paying quarterly dividends. One could speculate that the 
frequency of dividend payments would matter in regards to dividend smoothing, and thus make 
Sweden an interesting subject of study.  
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1.3 Purpose and research questions 
The main purpose of this paper is to see if the smoothing of dividends is a pertinent 
phenomenon in Swedish public firms. If so, this study also aims to identify what characteristics 
of Swedish public firms that drive the dividend smoothing. This is done by trying to answer the 
following research questions; 
 
1. To what extent do Swedish public firms smooth their dividends? 
 
2. Can any determinants of dividend smoothing behavior in Swedish firms be identified? 
 
3. How do these results compare to similar international studies? 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
This study covers Swedish firms listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Stock Exchange, hence cross 
listed companies having their main office in foreign countries are excluded. Further, in order to 
capture the dividend smoothing, companies are required to have been paying dividends for all the 
years covered in the sample period 2001-2012. If a company has not been listed this entire 
period, then it is required that it has been listed and been paying dividends for at least seven 
years. 
 
1.5 Thesis outline 
In chapter 2, the theoretical framework used as a foundation to this study is presented. This will 
provide an overview of the current knowledge base regarding dividend smoothing and what 
implications information asymmetry, agency theory, investor clientele and share repurchases 
might have on dividend policy. Chapter 3 contains a description about the methodology used to 
complete the study. Discussion regarding sample, different variables, and the reliability and 
validity of this study are also covered in this chapter. In chapter 4, the results of this study are 
briefly outlined to be further discussed in detail in chapter 5. A summary of this study is 
presented in chapter 6, after which potential areas of further research are discussed.   
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, the underlying theories and previous research relevant to this field of study are presented. Hopefully 
this gives the reader an understanding and knowledge about the background on which this study is based on. The 
theoretical framework is organized into the chapters “Dividend policy”, “Dividend smoothing”, “Information 
asymmetry”, “Agency theory”, “Investor clientele”, “The role of share repurchases”, and “Discussion and analysis 
of empirical studies”.   
 
2.1 Dividend policy 
As previously stated, Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) irrelevance theorem is based upon the 
assumptions of perfect capital markets and that the payout of the firm does not interfere with its 
investment policy. While this may be true, capital markets are not perfect in reality. There are 
several features or assumptions of a perfect capital market that make it ‘perfect’ which Miller and 
Modigliani’s theory relies on. These assumptions are described by Ogden et al. (2002); 
Damodaran (2001); Berk and DeMarzo (2009). One such assumption is that all investors in the 
market are rational meaning that they will always make decisions that result in the most optimal 
outcome. This is obviously not the case as most investors behave irrationally frequently. There is 
also an assumption of no information asymmetries and that information is readily available at no 
costs in a perfect market. In reality, there will always be degrees of information asymmetries 
between different stakeholders. In a perfect market, there are also no investors large enough to 
influence the price of securities. In reality there are many institutions and even individual 
investors with such strong power positions that their selling, or buying, of shares can affect the 
share price of a firm. Another assumption is that there are no taxes, flotation or transaction costs 
in a perfect capital market. In all developed countries and capital markets, these costs do exist. As 
for dividends for example there is often a double taxation since the dividends are taxed after that 
firms have paid corporate taxes (Pattenden and Twite, 2008). Further assumptions are that 
securities are infinitely divisible and finally that all firms’ investment policy is known and does not 
change. In reality, only the firm can choose when and whether a stock split or reverse stock split 
will occur and also the investment policy of the firm will vary over time. 
 
Since these assumptions are relaxed in reality, a setting is created where the payout policy matters 
for firm value. Because of this, the firm has to come to the decision of whether to distribute the 
cash or to retain it. Ogden et al. (2002) argue that dividends have three key effects on a firm's 
equity, namely that they reduce internal funds available for investments, increase the need of 
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external funding, and increase the firm’s leverage. Central questions regarding the payout policy 
are thus future financing needs and future investment opportunities. 
 
If the firm has positive net present value (NPV) investment opportunities that have not yet been 
financed, then no payout to shareholders should occur as value creation is possible with positive 
NPV projects whereas distribution to shareholders neither creates nor destroys value (Berk and 
DeMarzo, 2009). This is in line with Miller & Modigliani’s reasoning that a firm’s payout policy 
does not matter (in a perfect market) unless it interferes with the firm’s investment policies. If 
paying out cash to owners hinders the firm from investing in positive NPV projects, then value 
creation is lost and the payout policy of the firm is not optimized from a firm value maximization 
perspective. One could however argue that if shareholders can make better use of the cash, i.e. 
create better return on investments than the firm, then logically the firm should pay out dividends 
anyways.  
 
The main advantage in retaining cash as opposed to distributing it to shareholders, when all 
positive NPV projects have been financed, is that it serves as a cushion in bad times. The recent 
financial crisis reminded firms the importance of this. Having excess cash, or financial slack, on 
hand also enables a firm to much easier invest in positive NPV investment opportunities as they 
arise (Ogden et al., 2002). This way, the firm will not need to issue new equity or raise new debt. 
Another positive aspect of having excess cash is that it can reduce the cost of raising debt in the 
future as their collateral increases with more cash (Berk and DeMarzo, 2009).   
 
There are also negative aspects of having excess cash, like increased agency costs (Ogden et al., 
2002). Such costs incur due to the conflicting interests between agents (managers) and their 
principals (owners). Managers wanting to maximize their own wealth as opposed to maximizing 
shareholder wealth can result in excess spending by managers. Investments in negative NPV 
projects, so called empire building, are such costs. Doing this will be beneficial for managers in 
the form of job protection and higher compensation for example. Another negative aspect of not 
paying dividends and thus having a larger cushion is that managers can be less inspired to do 
their best and focus wholeheartedly on the firm’s core strategy as the cushion will make up for 
possible bad results. By having a smaller cushion, managers would feel the need to do their very 
best all the time which would increase firm value. Also, by keeping excess cash from the 
shareholders, managers will not as often or as frequently turn to capital markets for external 
financing. In one way this is a positive aspect of having excess cash as discussed above, but this 
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also decreases the monitoring from debt holders who are much better and more inclined to 
monitor than shareholders are (Damodaran, 2001). Due to the conflicting interest between 
managers and shareholders, monitoring is needed to keep management in check and prevent any 
non-value-maximizing activity (Ogden et al., 2002). Thus, agency costs can arise with the firm not 
turning to the capital markets. This is something that Easterbrook (1984) talks about. He states 
that a possible reason for actually paying out dividends despite the obvious flaws of dividends, is 
that it can reduce the cost associated with information asymmetry as the firm frequently has to 
reach out to banks and bondholders for financing, which increases the monitoring of the 
managers.    
 
2.2 Dividend smoothing 
Dividend smoothing can be described as a method managers use to avoid adverse stockholder 
reactions when setting the dividend level. Lintner’s work in the 1950s on dividend smoothing is 
seen as the pillar and the foundation of later research of this dividend phenomenon. Lintner 
(1956) interviewed CEOs and other key managers of 28 American companies to draw 
conclusions on firms’ dividend policy behavior and why firms smooth their dividends relative 
earnings. He found that managers target a long-term payout ratio when deciding upon dividend 
policy. Further, he found that firms do not decide what level dividends should be set at each new 
period but rather how much the dividends should change. Managers only raised their dividends 
partly of the amount that was actually supported by the financials after a strong financial result. If 
additional increases in dividends were still justified, the managers would continue to raise the 
dividends in the subsequent years. He referred to this as dividends being “conservative”, and 
argue that strong avoidance of “erratic changes” in dividend policy is very important to firms. 
This is due to management’s strong belief in the market preferring stable dividends over more 
volatile payments. Lintner’s (1956) study implied that management thought that in the eyes of 
investors a change in current net earnings was the solely valid factor in changing the dividend 
rate. That is why management targets net earnings in the payout ratio.  
 
Consistent with his findings, Lintner (1956) developed the partial adjustment model, which is a 
model specification of how managers smooth their dividends. In his model he presumed that the 
change in dividends from one year to another corresponded to the earnings, the target payout 
ratio and the speed of adjustment. This model can be specified in a regression where speed of 
adjustment is a coefficient. The speed of adjustment is particularly important and is a common 
measure of dividend smoothing. The speed of adjustment estimates how fast the target payout 
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ratio is adjusted in relation to changes in a firm’s earnings. The slower the target payout ratio is 
adjusted, the higher the degree of smoothing.  Lintner (1956) argues that the constant in this 
model will be positive for the most firms because of the reluctance of managers to cut dividends. 
The partial adjustment model will be more closely described in the methodological section, 
namely section 3.4.1. 
 
Lately, researchers have started to question how well Lintner’s model actually describes the 
dividend smoothing phenomenon. Brav et al. (2005) find that this apparent link between 
dividends and earnings has deteriorated since Lintner’s study some 50 years ago. One reason is 
that nowadays, CFOs in the US are less prone to target the payout ratio when deciding the 
dividend level. They find that dividend per share is a more commonly used target. This can have 
certain implications on when deciding to what target the dividends actually revert to if smoothing 
occur. However, the actual target is seldom (never) known and a good approximation of a target 
is to analyze the previous dividends to try to see a pattern. Also Lambrecht and Myers (2012) 
have some concerns as they mathematically derive Lintner’s dividend smoothing model. They 
argue that the fit of the model has degraded as share repurchases have become more common. 
Even though they do not believe that the model is redundant, they are providing evidence for 
that the model rather should be explaining the total payout instead of only cash dividends. 
 
With regards to dividend smoothing, the prevalent literature does mainly handle three different 
possible sources of dividend smoothing, as mentioned earlier. These are motivations based on 
information asymmetry, agency problems and smoothing motivated by investor clientele. These 
will be discussed in the next few sections.  
 
 
2.3 Information asymmetry  
In regard to dividend smoothing, Leary and Michaely (2011) divide the information asymmetry 
problems into four different categories; coarse signaling models, principal-agent models, 
information asymmetry contributing to external financial constraints, and information asymmetry 
among investors based on their relative information situation. The different information 
asymmetry models all imply that firms with greater information asymmetry are more likely to 
enact in dividend smoothing than firms with lower information asymmetry (Jeong, 2013). Below 
follows a closer explanation to each of these models: 
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2.3.1 Coarse signaling models 
As discussed before, a common view is that dividends send signals about the prospects of the 
firm, this is the essence of the dividends signaling hypothesis (Berk and DeMarzo, 2009). 
Regarding the signaling of dividends, Berk and DeMarzo (2009) also make the comparison with a 
firm’s leverage. That is, similar signals are sent to the market if a firm issues new debt; it shows 
that managers feel confident that they will be able to meet the interest payments on the debt 
which in turn signals financial strength. The same goes for dividends; by raising the dividends, it 
shows that management is confident in that future earnings will be able to support this higher 
dividend level. 
 
The signaling model emanates from the view that well-informed managers use dividends to signal 
future performance of the company. By increasing dividends, managers will signal that they 
believe in a positive development in future performance, and by cutting dividends they signal that 
the outlook for the future is not as prosperous as before. Guttman, Kadan, and Kandel (2010) 
suggest that firms use sticky dividends that are partially pooled since the stock market penalize 
companies that cut dividends and reward companies that have stable and  increasing dividends. 
According the assumption of partially pooled dividends, it will require large deviations from the 
expected cash flows before firms diverge from the intended payout. Similar observations are 
made in a study by Grullon et al. (2002). They noted that during 1967-1993, firms that increased 
their dividends by 10% or more experienced an increase in stock price of 1.34% on average after 
the dividend announcement. Similarly, a firm that decreased their dividends by 10% or more 
during this same time period experienced a decrease in their stock price of 3.71% after the 
announcement. This indicates that the market punishes cuts in dividends more strongly than they 
reward similar increases in dividends. This is one of several common explanations to why firms 
choose to engage in dividend smoothing; by keeping dividends stable despite a higher volatility in 
earnings, they can avoid certain negative market reactions causing their stock to suffer.    
  
Repurchases can signal similar information as dividends, but there are differences between 
repurchases and dividends when it comes to signaling. The first one is that, in general, 
repurchases are used much less frequently than dividends (e.g. Jagannathan, Stephens, and 
Weisbach, 1999). Dividends are often paid out on a regular basis, such as quarterly, biannually, or 
yearly, whereas repurchases on a larger scale often occur irregularly, less frequently and are less 
sticky than dividends. Therefore, Skinner (2008) argue, there is smaller likelihood of smoothing 
of repurchases than dividend smoothing. From this point of view, the argument is that signaling 
by buying back the firm’s own shares is not as strong as committing to a dividend level and 
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sticking to it. On the other hand, as many studies and theories have argued, managers, who have 
better information about the firm than investors and other market participants, will often have 
this information in mind when deciding to repurchase shares (or issue new stock) (Baker, 
Ruback, and Wurgler, 2007). If the firm’s stock price is perceived as being overpriced by the 
management, based on their better information, they tend to issue more stock. Similarly if the 
stock is undervalued, management will be more inclined to buy back shares. Berk and DeMarzo 
(2009) liken this with the firm investing in positive NPV projects. So due to managers having this 
insider information and taking it into consideration when repurchasing, they implicitly signal that 
the firm is undervalued and thus should result in similar market reactions that dividend increases 
creates. 
 
2.3.2 Principal-agent models 
The principal-agent model refers to the information asymmetry between managers and 
stockholders. According to this model, managers can be worried about keeping their jobs, 
therefore they understate good outcomes so they can manage eventual future adverse shocks 
(Leary and Michaely, 2011). According to Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) it is important to 
distinguish this from an agency issue. It is about smoothing its earnings and in the end this will 
also influence dividends. This means that the excess cash will act as a cushion for liquidation if a 
bad event would occur. While enforcing this cushion, managers will keep the dividends stable, 
and thus, smooth their dividends. Thus, information asymmetry issues are expected to be more 
severe in companies that lacks transparency. Therefore, dividend smoothing is expected to be 
higher in firms with low transparency.  
 
2.3.3 External financial constraints 
This view is similar to the pecking order theory which states that a firm will pick the financing 
that is the cheapest, going from retained earnings being cheapest to external debt and finally 
external equity being the most expensive form of financing (Majluf and Myers, 1984). According 
to Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) so can external financial constraints be a determining factor 
when it comes to dividends. Those firms that have a relatively high cost of external financing is 
expected to be less likely to pay dividends. Since external financing is more costly than internally 
generated capital, there is an incentive to maintain any internally generated cash within the 
company. In case of a cash flow stream that is larger than expected, firms with financial 
constraints are expected to maintain the extra cash within the company. Therefore, firms with 
higher external financing costs are more likely to smooth their dividends since this would make 
sure that there is internally generated capital left after dividends are paid. 
14 
 
 
2.3.4 Information asymmetry among investors 
Information asymmetry among investors might be another reason to why companies smooth 
their dividends. Michaely and Leary (2011) argue that dividends can protect relatively uninformed 
investors from being expropriated by relatively more well-informed investors. Individual 
investors are expected to be less informed than institutional investors. Individual investors are 
therefore expected to prefer dividends since it can reduce their informational disadvantage. 
Therefore firms that have many individual investors are expected to smooth their dividends 
more, and potential excess cash are expected to be distributed through share repurchases. 
 
2.4 Agency based models 
Agency theory is a fundamental framework behind many assumptions in corporate finance. It is a 
theory that describes the complex situation where managers are handling the assets of the 
shareholders. Agency costs can arise through both information asymmetries and conflicts of 
interest. When information asymmetries exist, agency problems can include the investors’ 
suspicion that the managers do not act in the best interest of the shareholders. Easterbrook 
(1984) argues that since the managers do not receive any residual claim on the firm’s earnings, 
there is a great risk of deviation between the interest of managers and that of the investors. The 
risk that the managers will act in their own interest instead of maximizing the wealth of 
shareholders are often incurring agency costs (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005). Agency costs refer to all 
costs that occur as followed by these conflicting interests such as monitoring costs or 
opportunity costs of the management operating sub-optimally. 
 
It is said that a company bearing a lot of cash assets can be subject of agency issues. Jensen 
(1986) describes the agency issues of free cash flow and argue that managers have incentives to 
let their firms to grow beyond their optimal size. He also argues that dividends, as well as 
increased leverage, could decrease the power of managers and constrain the managers to strive 
for these objectives as it increases the managers’ need to reach for external financing. When 
reaching for external financing the company will most likely be scrutinized by the new lender, and 
this will decrease managers’ opportunities to act in self-interest. In addition to this, high 
dividends can also reduce the agency risk that the management will engage in wasteful activities, 
since there is simply less cash available.  
 
An agency-based explanation to why firms smooth their dividends is also arising from these 
implications. Allen et al. (1999) argue that institutional investors can decrease agency costs due to 
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their monitoring, which in turn can lower the company’s cost of equity. Leary and Michaely 
(2011) argue that managers can attract institutional investors if they decide to pay high dividends. 
This is related to their tax benefits in the US; that institutions pay a lower tax on dividends than 
retail investors, and due to their strong position, institutional investors, who are desired because 
of their monitoring skills, have the power to impose penalties on dividend cuts. However, Brav et 
al. (2005) find that when interviewing numerous CEOs, CFOs, and other key managers at US 
firms, firms do not really intend to use dividends as a way to attract institutional ownership.  
 
Leary and Michaely (2011) predict that companies that are dealing with large agency issues are 
expected to pay higher levels of dividends. They also describe that a tradeoff exist between low 
leverage (in order to access cheap external financing) and paying high levels of dividends (in 
order to deal with agency issues). This leads to an assumption that a company exposed to agency 
problems is engaging in dividend smoothing in order to regularly pay high dividends while 
maintaining a rather low leverage. Leary and Michaely are arguing that this is contradicting the 
financial constraints assumption that predicts smoothers to have low dividends and high-cost of 
capital.  
 
2.5 Investor clientele 
A commonly described motive behind dividends is the clientele effect, which is about different 
types of investors having different preferences regarding dividends (Denis and Osobov, 2008). 
First of all, there are many types of investors, but for simplicity sake, these will be divided into 
individual investors in one group and institutional investors in another. The motivations behind 
how the company serves the investor clientele is quite ambiguous as one could argue that 
institutions desire dividends due to their tax advantage of dividends, and one could also argue 
that individual investors prefer dividends due to their loss aversion (Baker and Wurgler, 2011).  
 
From a tax advantage point of view, institutions are taxed less on dividends relative to individual 
investors and thus prefer ownership in firms that pay higher dividends. Individual investors on 
the other hand should according to this reasoning then prefer to invest in firms with low or no 
dividends as they are relatively higher taxed on dividends (Allen et al., 1999). Brav et al., (2005) 
argue that firms with a high presence of institutional ownership will be very reluctant to cut 
dividends and that dividends are ‘sticky’ and ‘smooth’. Since these firms will want to keep their 
institutional owners year after year due to their monitoring abilities as discussed in section 2.4, 
they will smooth their dividends to keep this valuable clientele ownership (Allen et al., 1999). 
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The other argument with regards to clientele effects says that individual investors are more loss 
averse than institutions (Baker and Wurgler, 2011) and thus prefer dividend-paying firms over 
non-dividend firms more than institutions. The reasoning is that certain dividends are considered 
safer than uncertain future capital gains. They are more loss averse than institutions in part due to 
their information disadvantage relative institutions. Further, Leary and Michaely (2011) argue that 
individual investors can reduce their dividend taxation by long term tax planning. Thus, firms 
with more individual investors are expected to smooth more as the tax planning by individuals 
requires certainty of dividends over a longer period of time. The incentive for these investors to 
utilize tax planning increases as their taxation on dividends is higher. 
 
These two ways of looking at the clientele effects regarding dividends are contradictory as one 
states that individuals should prefer dividends and dividend smoothing more while the other one 
states that institutions should desire it more. This have to be taken into consideration when 
making the analysis. 
 
2.6 The role of share repurchases 
Recently, many studies have focused on the decreasing importance of dividends. Fama and 
French (2001) are in fact talking about ‘disappearing dividends’ as the firms that pay dividends 
have decreased in numbers during the past decades. Fama and French largely credit this 
evolvement to the changing characteristics of the firms listed on the public stock exchanges, but 
also to the increased portion of firms that have never paid dividends. What on the other hand has 
increased over the past decades (at least for US firms) is the use of share repurchases as an 
alternative mean to distribute excess cash. The increasing importance of share repurchases can 
also be seen in Europe. Von Eije and Megginson (2008) conducted a study of European firms 
from 15 different countries and found that share repurchases of firms increased over the sample 
period of 1989 to 2005.   
 
A study conducted by Brav et al. (2005) indicates that managers are more hesitant to cut 
dividends than to cut share repurchases, mainly due to the perception that the market will 
respond more strongly to a cut in dividends. According to their study, some managers are willing 
to sell off assets, borrow money, or forgo profitable projects, before they decide to cut dividends. 
This does not hold for share repurchases since they are normally conducted on an irregular basis 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2005). 
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In Sweden, public companies were initially allowed to repurchase shares in the open market 
beginning in March 2000. Swedish public companies are only allowed to repurchase 10 percent of 
the total outstanding stock (ABL 19:15). However, if the company is about to repurchase more 
than the allowed amount of shares, the company would need to sell them within 6 months or the 
share capital is going to be reduced with the disallowed stocks proportion of the outstanding 
stock (ABL 19:16).   
 
2.7 Discussion and analysis of empirical studies 
The literature and previous research on dividend smoothing is divided in some aspects and more 
concurring in other aspects. Most, if not all, studies investigating dividend smoothing uses one, 
several, or all of the dividend and smoothing determinants, namely asymmetric information, 
agency issues, clientele effects, and purely tax based explanations in some form. The two theories 
that stand on opposing sides to each other are information asymmetry theories and agency 
theories. Theories on information asymmetry argue that a higher degree of information 
asymmetry should result in higher dividends and dividend smoothing in order to mitigate the 
costs of information asymmetry and uncertainty of investors. Agency based theories on the other 
hand argue that firms subject to higher agency costs should smooth their dividends more in order 
to mitigate such costs. Further, firms that are subject to higher degrees of agency costs are in 
general firms that are profitable, are considered cash cows, have less investment opportunities, 
etcetera. Incidentally, these firms are on the other hand less subject to information asymmetry 
costs, and therein lies the contradiction in these two theories.  
 
In table 2.1 a summary of some of the most cited papers in the area of dividend smoothing that 
have been published during the 21st century are presented. As can be interpreted there is no 
consensus of which factor that is more central with regards to dividend policy and smoothing, 
with different studies showing different results.  Several studies like Leary and Michaely (2011) 
and La Porta et al. (2000) seem to argue for the superiority of agency based explanations with 
regards to dividend smoothing. Then there are other studies like Chemmanur et al. (2010) that 
give support for the signaling and information asymmetry explanations. Interestingly, there are 
also studies like Al-Yahyaee et al. (2010) that actually give support for both theories while other 
studies instead give no support for either explanation, like Brav et al. (2005). Jeong (2013) argues 
that macroeconomic factors such as interest level and taxes have a significant effect on dividend 
smoothing, this however, contradicts Al-Yahyaee et al. (2010) that finds that absence of taxation 
on dividends in Omani firms do not have the expected effects. 
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Table 2.1 Summary of empirical studies and main findings 
Authors Area of study 
Studied 
Period Country Sample Main findings 
La Porta, 
Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny 
(2000) 
 
International 
comparison of 
dividend policy 
1989-
1994 
33 
Countries 
4 103 Support agency based explanation of 
dividend policy. Shareholder 
protection highly relevant.  
Brav, Graham, 
Harvey, and 
Michaely (2005) 
Payout policy 2005 US 384 Managers prefer repurchases due to its 
flexibility. Weak support for agency, 
information asymmetry and clientele 
motivations in deciding dividend 
policy. 
 
Aivazian, Booth, 
and Cleary 
(2006) 
Dividend smoothing 
and debt ratings 
1981-
1999 
US 127 516 
(firm 
year 
obs.) 
Bond rated firms tend to smooth their 
dividends more. Higher leverage 
associated with lower degree of 
dividends and dividend smoothing. 
 
Andres, Betzer, 
Goergen, and 
Renneboog 
(2009) 
Dividend smoothing 
and partial 
adjustment model 
1984-
2005 
Germany 220 Dividends more volatile than in US 
and UK. Cuts in dividends occur more 
frequently and higher speed of 
adjustment in Germany. 
 
Al-Yahyaee, 
Pham, and 
Walter (2010) 
Dividend smoothing 
in a unique 
environment 
1989-
2004 
Oman 545 No support for tax motivated dividend 
smoothing. Supporting agency- and 
information asymmetry based motives.  
 
Chemmanur, 
He, Hu, and Liu 
(2010) 
Differences in 
dividend smoothing 
1984-
2002 
Hong 
Kong 
and US 
153 
(HK) + 
603 
(US) 
US firms smooth dividends more. 
Support for signaling implications of 
differences in the two countries' tax 
regimes. 
 
Leary and 
Michaely (2011) 
Determinants of 
dividend smoothing; 
Comprehensive study 
on dividend 
smoothing 
 
1985-
2005 
US 1 335 Increasing trend in dividend 
smoothing. Dividend smoothing 
associated with agency costs. 
Jeong (2013) Determinants of 
dividend smoothing 
1980-
2012 
Korea 279 Korean firms have a lower degree of 
dividend smoothing than US firms. 
Dividend smoothing influenced by 
firm characteristics and 
macroeconomic factors. Support 
neither agency- nor information 
asymmetry based explanations. 
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While criticism is directed towards Lintner’s original model, most of the studies in table 2.1 that 
tackle the problem of dividend smoothing uses his partial adjustment model to estimate the 
speed of adjustment. One source of criticism for the Lintner model is that the target payout ratio 
is unknown and must be estimated. Further, Brav et al. (2005) finds that American firms do no 
longer target a payout ratio in the same extent as before, but rather target the dividend per share. 
This could be cumbersome when using the partial adjustment model.  
 
Some studies use alternative measures of dividend smoothing besides the partial adjustment 
model. For example, Leary and Michaely (2011) use a model where they try to capture the relative 
volatility of dividends to volatility of earnings. However, there is no existing consensus regarding 
an alternative to Lintner’s partial adjustment model, and which is also the model that is still 
mostly used to measure. Therefore, from a validity point of view, it can arguably be safer to use 
the Lintner model.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter contains a detailed description of the methodology that is used in this study. Research approach, data 
sample and collection, the regression model, and both the dependent and independent variables are discussed. 
Further, how to interpret the regressions in terms of significance levels as well as normality, heteroskadasticity, 
nonlinearity and multicollinearity are also discussed. Lastly, the reliability and validity of the study is discussed. 
 
3.1 Methodological Approach 
The methodological approach used in this study is largely influenced by Leary and Michaely 
(2011) but also combines elements with the study made by Jeong (2013). Both studies are similar 
in that they investigate smoothing behavior of firms and what factors drive dividend smoothing 
in the US and Korea respectively. However, the theoretical approach of the two scholars differs 
somewhat in that the theory that Leary and Michaely use is based purely on three market frictions 
that are seen as the possible sources of dividend smoothing. Jeong on the other hand bases his 
study on that the differences between Korea and other developed countries may be a reason for 
how Korean firms smooth their dividends. The method used in this study is to some extent 
mimicking the way Leary and Michaely (2011) use information asymmetry, agency costs, and 
investor clientele as possible explanations for dividend smoothing. However, some variables 
utilized in Jeong (2013) is used as a complement or substitute. In line with both of these studies, 
Lintner’s (1956) speed of adjustment model is used to capture the degree of dividend smoothing 
for Swedish firms. The approach is also based on the existing literature and previous research 
which have been discussed in the previous chapters. 
 
3.1.1 Research approach 
The research approach of a study can either be inductive or deductive. According to Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill (2009), with an inductive approach, the researcher generates theories from 
the data collected and then relates the conclusions to existing theories. In a deductive approach 
however, the researcher uses existing theories which will be tested using data. This paper uses a 
deductive research approach since already existing literature and theories on dividend smoothing, 
and its determinants, are used on Swedish firms. 
 
It is also important to distinguish between different kinds of data. Data can either be quantitative 
or qualitative. Saunders et al. (2009) explain how a quantitative approach is a collection technique 
or data analysis procedure that generates numerical data while a qualitative approach is a 
collection technique that generates non-numerical data. For this study, numerical data is required 
as the aim is to study how certain variables impact the speed of adjustment of firms’ dividend 
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level so that hypothesis testing can be done. Secondary data is also used, referring to data that has 
already been collected for other purposes (Saunders et al., 2009), as this type of study requires 
historic firm data.    
 
 
3.2 Data 
3.2.1 Data collection 
The two databases that were used to gather all relevant data except from share repurchases were 
Thomson Reuters Datastream and Thomson Reuters Eikon. From the trading software 
Thomson Reuters Eikon data regarding credit rating (used in the decision making whether a 
company is a cash cow), ownership concentration, and institutional holdings. Data regarding 
share repurchases were acquired manually from Nasdaq OMX’s web page where such 
information is publicly available. Swedish companies listed on Stockholm Stock Exchange are 
forced, due to legislation, to disclose information about trading in their own shares (Nasdaq 
OMX, 2014). All other data were collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
 
The data sources above are considered highly reliable. Especially reliable are the data from 
Nasdaq OMX since it is regulated by law. However, entering this data manually leaves some 
room for human error. Hopefully, these errors are put to a minimum by a careful and accurate 
working method.  
 
3.2.2 Time period and sample 
The data in this study cover companies listed at the Nasdaq OMX Nordic Stockholm Stock 
Exchange as of 24 of April 2014. Companies from small-, mid- and large cap are included. The 
period covered is 2001 to 2012, and the main reason for this is that stock repurchases were first 
allowed in March 2000 and therefore 2001 would be the first full year where repurchases would 
be allowed. 
 
There are certain risks to using this approach in deciding the sample, and one of the most 
prominent is the survivor bias. This means that dead or suspended listings do not make the 
sample, which might bias the results.  
 
After removing companies that lack a sufficient data set for the desired variables in Datastream, 
229 companies remain for the first round of analysis. An interesting observation emanating from 
this sample is that only 12 different companies repurchase shares during at least one year where 
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they have not paid dividends. Moreover, only two of the companies have repurchased shares 
when not paying dividends for at least half of the sampled years. These figures are effectively 
questioning the existing beliefs of repurchases being a widely used as a substitution for dividends. 
138 companies, or a little more than 60 percent of the original sample, have not used repurchases 
during the sample period. Only 23 companies are repurchasing more than half of the years that 
data is sampled, and the number of companies that is repurchasing shares during all of the 
sampled years are limited to three.  
 
Table 3.1: Number of companies paying dividends in a given year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 describes the number of companies paying dividends in a given year. In the original 
sample, 106 of the 229 companies paid dividends for all of their sampling years.  28 companies 
did not pay dividends at all. 66 companies paid dividends for less than half of the years sampled. 
137 companies paid dividends in 75 percent of the years. The percentage of companies paying 
dividends is lowest in 2002 and 2003 where it is close to 60 percent, and highest in 2007 where 78 
percent of the companies paid dividends. In the year of 2012, close to 75 percent of the 
companies were paying dividends. Thus, it is possible to anticipate an increasing trend in the 
fraction of companies paying dividends. 
 
To be able to measure dividend smoothing, two selection criteria are imposed on the sample. The 
company should have been listed for at least seven years and also having paid dividends for all of 
the sampling years. These selection criteria creates a trade-off between getting reliable estimates 
of the speed of adjustment without losing out all that much on the number of observations. The 
49 
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final sample consists of 85 companies out of which 44 are listed on large cap, 22 are listed on mid 
cap and 19 are listed on small cap.  
 
 
3.3 Regression model 
In general terms, this paper follows Leary and Michaely’s (2011) study, in order to capture the 
determinants of dividend smoothing. The ordinary least square (OLS) regression model is carried 
out in two steps in order to investigate the causal relationship between the explanatory variables 
and the dependent variable.  
 
In the first step, regressions are made through each cross-section unit (each company) in order to 
determine each firm’s specific speed of adjustment. The speed of adjustment captures how firms 
smooth their dividends over time. Chapter 3.4.1 describes more in detail how the speed of 
adjustment is determined.  
 
In the second step, cross-sectional data is used in order to investigate what characteristics that 
determine the speed of adjustment. From the perspective of this study’s scope it would have 
been desirable to use panel data, however, since the speed of adjustment is determined over 
several years, panel data is not really an option unless the speed of adjustment is determined as a 
rolling value. As for the independent variables, both firm medians and averages collected from 
the sample period are used in order to determine how they influence the speed of adjustment. 
This increases the reliability of the study.  
 
Since there are no clear and widely accepted determinants of dividend smoothing, there is neither 
any existing regression models explaining dividend smoothing. To investigate whether the 
suggested independent variables have a causal effect on the speed of adjustment, a regression 
including all the assumed regressors is first run. Thereafter, the variables that turn out to be 
significant are used as control variables when exploring the significance of all the other variables 
one by one. This way of conducting the regressions are in line with Leary and Michaely (2011). 
 
3.4 Variables 
3.4.1 Dependent variable: Speed of adjustment 
To determine the degree of dividend smoothing across the entities in the sample, regressions are 
run through each entity to receive an estimate of speed of adjustment. The speed of adjustment is 
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a commonly used measure of dividend smoothing used in many previous studies (e.g. Lintner 
1956; Fama and Babiak, 1968; Goddard, McMillan, and Wilson, 2006; Andres et al., 2009; 
Chemmanur et al., 2010). The speed of adjustment estimates how fast the target payout ratio is 
adjusted in relation to the change in a firm’s earnings. The slower the target payout ratio is 
adjusted, the higher the degree of smoothing.  
Below follows the Lintner model regression (1) as it is implied by Lintner (1956): 
 
(1)                     (                                           (   ))       
 
Where            is the change in dividend from the preceding time period, t-1.   is a 
constant. SOA is the speed of adjustment, which describes how fast the dividends change in 
relation to a change in earnings. If SOA is equal to 1, the dividends are adjusted to the same 
magnitude as the change in Earnings. If it is less than one, there are only partially adjustments to 
the divergences in earnings. The Target payout ratio is a target of cash dividends as a fraction of 
earnings in a given year. Shortly, a ratio that the management strive to maintain. Together, 
(                                ) would equal the cash dividend a firm would have if it 
solely relied on its target payout ratio.          (   ) is the dividend that actually got paid in the 
preceding year.     is an error-term.  
 
The target payout ratio is a variable that is not readily available. In line with Leary and Michaely 
(2011), the firm median payout ratio that is measured over the sample period is used to represent 
the target payout ratio. 
 
3.4.2 Independent variables 
 These variables have been used to explain what firm characteristics influence the decision to 
smooth dividends. Like Leary and Michaely (2011), these variables represent proxies for the 
different market frictions that are possible sources of dividend smoothing; information 
asymmetry, agency problems and investor clientele. Some variables are used for two or even all of 
the three sources of dividend smoothing. Also note that, sometimes they are interpreted 
differently, meaning that for one source of smoothing, a proxy should show a positive 
relationship with dividend smoothing whereas for another source, that same proxy is expected to 
show a negative relationship.   
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Firm maturity 
As proxies for firm maturity, firm age and firm size are used. The rationale of analyzing firm 
maturity is that more mature firms should experience less information asymmetry. Leary and 
Michaely (2011) argue that older firms should not be exposed to as much information asymmetry 
as newer firms since they are better known by the market. The same argument goes for firm size; 
the larger the firm, the more well-known it is to investors and market participants. In line with 
Jeong (2013), listing years (in Datastream) is used as proxy for firm age, and the natural log of 
total assets as proxy for firm size.  
 
Firm age and firm size are expected to be negatively correlated with information 
asymmetry. Low information asymmetry is expected to yield a high speed of adjustment. 
So the coefficients of firm size and firm age are expected to be positive.  
 
Growth opportunities  
The market-to book ratio is a proxy for growth opportunities. This is a measure of the value gap 
between a firm's market value and its’ book value. The rationale is that the larger the gap is, the 
more investment opportunities the company is expected to have. Since investment opportunities 
are hard to evaluate for investors, a large market-to-book ratio is expected to bring greater 
information asymmetry.  
 
Thus, from an information asymmetry point of view, the market-to-book ratio should be 
negatively correlated to the speed of adjustment.  
 
Growth opportunities are also related to some agency problems. Companies with less investment 
opportunities are expected to have more excess cash. Having more excess cash means that the 
problem of free cash flow is greater and this increases the overinvestment problem (Leary and 
Michaely, 2011). Therefore, it can be expected that firms with higher market-to-book ratios will 
pay out less and smooth their dividends to lesser extent. 
 
In contrast to the information asymmetry argument, the market-to-book ratio in an 
agency setting should instead have a positive relationship to the speed of adjustment.  
 
26 
 
Asset tangibility  
The nature of assets is an important aspect of information asymmetry. It should be easier for 
investors to value tangible assets compared to intangibles and growth opportunities. Accordingly, 
firms with larger proportion of tangible assets are expected to have lower information 
asymmetry. In line with Leary and Michaely (2011), net property, plant and equipment (PPE) to 
total assets are used as a proxy for the nature of assets. 
 
PPE to total assets is expected to be negatively correlated with information asymmetry. 
As low information asymmetry is expected to generate a high speed of adjustment, the 
PPE to Assets coefficient is expected to be positive.   
 
Risk 
As in Leary and Michaely (2011), return volatility functions both like a risk measure and an 
information asymmetry measure. A greater volatility is associated with higher uncertainty and 
accordingly greater information asymmetry. The return volatility is calculated on a yearly basis as 
the standard deviation of changes in monthly stock prices.  
 
As the return volatility increases, higher information asymmetry is expected. Thus, the 
return volatility is expected to be negatively correlated to the speed of adjustment.  
 
Analyst coverage 
Analyst coverage and analyst attributes highlight the information gap between inside and outside 
investors. Leary and Michaely (2011) measure the dispersion between different analysts’ forecasts. 
The greater dispersion, the greater is the information gap, i.e. the information asymmetry. The 
forecast dispersion is measured through the standard deviation of analysts’ 12 month forecast of 
earnings per share divided by the average of analysts’ 12 month forecast of earnings per share, 
both are collected from Datastream.  
 
Accordingly, a great dispersion of analysts’ forecasts are expected to yield a low speed of 
adjustment. Thus, the expected coefficient is negative.  
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Also the number of analysts is a proxy for information asymmetry between uninformed 
and informed investors. More analysts are associated with lower asymmetry of 
information. Therefore, the coefficient of number of analysts is expected to be positive.  
 
Investment horizon 
In Leary and Michaely (2011), the investment horizon of stockholders is proxied by the stock 
turnover. The stock turnover is calculated as the number of shares traded in a given year divided 
by the number of outstanding shares in the same year. Guttman et al. (2010) imply that longer 
investor horizon is associated to lower information asymmetry and lower dividend smoothing. 
 
Since low stock turner is translated to longer investor horizon, the coefficient of stock 
turnover should be negative. 
 
Institutional holdings 
The percentage of institutional holding as a percentage of total common shares is used as a proxy 
for all three market frictions. From an information asymmetry perspective, institutional holdings 
are expected to lower the information asymmetry between insider and outsider investors since 
institutions are relatively better at gathering information than individual investors (Allen et al. 
1999). Hence, institutional ownership should be linked to lower information asymmetry. 
 
This should result in a positive relationship between institutional holding and the speed 
of adjustment from an information asymmetry point of view.  
 
From an agency point of view, having institutional ownership will lower agency costs due to the 
monitoring abilities and incentives. Through their power position, institutions can influence 
corporate behavior through monitoring and voting, as well as by the threat that they will sell their 
shares. According to Jeong (2013) companies exposed to agency conflicts are expected to smooth 
their dividends to greater extent in order to mitigate agency problems. 
 
In such case, institutional ownership is expected to be positively related to dividend 
smoothing. Hence from an agency point of view the coefficient of institutional holdings 
should be negative. 
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From the investor clientele point of view, there are two different implications on the relationship 
between the institutional holding variable and the speed of adjustment. 
 
From the institutional tax advantage point of view, the relationship is the same as for the 
agency perspective; a negative relationship between institutional holdings and the speed 
of adjustment.  
 
From an individual investor clientele perspective, a company is expected to have relatively more 
individual investors the lesser the share of institutional holding a company has. From this point 
of view individual investors tend to prefer dividends due to effects on tax planning and due to 
loss-aversion. Thus, companies with a larger share of individual investors are expected to smooth 
their dividends to a greater extent. 
 
Therefore, from an individual investor clientele perspective, a positive relationship 
between institutional holdings and the speed of adjustment is predicted. 
 
Cash cow 
Being a cash cow should result in the company being exposed to more agency problems as there 
is more excess cash and less investment opportunities. In line with Brav et al. (2005) a cash cow 
is described as a company that has positive earnings, good credit rating (A or higher, using 
Standard & Poor’s long-term rating standards) and a price to earnings ratio below the median for 
companies with a credit rating of A or higher.  
 
Being a cash cow should result in higher degree of dividend smoothing to resolve the 
agency issues related to excess cash holdings. Thus, in regards to speed of adjustment, 
the causality of the cash cow variable is negative.  
 
Ownership concentration  
The ownership stake of the ten largest shareholders is used as a proxy for ownership 
concentration. This is measured through ownership stake divided by the number of common 
shares outstanding and is intended to capture if the company is closely held by a family or a 
cluster of companies. Jeong (2013) argues that more closely held firms does not have as severe 
agency problems as firms with more dispersed ownership. It can thus be expected that a firm  
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with a higher concentration of ownership will not need to pay out and smooth as much as firms 
with dispersed ownership. 
 
This should result in the ownership concentration coefficient being positive in regards to 
the speed of adjustment.      
 
Financial slack 
As previously discussed, having excess cash, which is equivalent to financial slack, can incur 
higher agency costs. According to Jeong (2013) excess cash holdings can also be associated with a 
larger ‘cushion’ which will allow the company to smooth their dividends to a greater extent. The 
financial slack is measured through the cash and equivalents post from Datastream divided by 
total assets.  
 
Thus, from an agency point of view, cash-to-assets will have a negative effect of the 
speed of adjustment.   
 
Leverage 
Leverage has been associated with a lower degree of dividend smoothing in previous studies.2 As 
the opposite of financial slack, having high leverage will decrease the agency costs associated with 
excess cash (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Leverage is measured as total assets minus the book 
value of equity divided by total assets. 
 
From an agency perspective, higher leverage should thus result in a lower degree of 
smoothing due to lower agency costs and therefore the leverage coefficient should be 
positive in regards to the speed of adjustment.   
 
Stock repurchases 
Leary and Michaely (2011) find that firms that repurchase shares tend to smooth their dividends 
more. A dummy variable is included to control for whether a company repurchase shares in a 
given year. The dummy takes the value of 1 if the firm has repurchased any shares during a given 
year, 0 otherwise.  
 
                                                          
2 See for example Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2006). 
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As repurchasing companies are expected to smooth more, the expected coefficient of 
repurchases is assumed to be reverse to the speed of adjustment.  
 
Dividend level 
The dividend level is proxied by the payout ratio. In this case the payout ratio is basically the 
dividend per share divided by earnings per share. Leary and Michaely (2011) find that the degree 
of dividend smoothing is positively related to the dividend level.  
 
The payout ratio is assumed to have a negative effect on the speed of adjustment.  
 
3.5 Testing the regressions  
3.5.1 Significance levels and their implications 
Saunders et al. (2009) have a discussion of different errors that can occur when making inferences 
from a sample. They are referring to Type I and Type II errors. A Type I error occurs when the 
null hypothesis is rejected when it should not be rejected. In the case of this study such mistake 
could involve accepting a coefficient even though there is no existing relationship in reality. A 
type II error infer the opposite, namely that the null hypothesis is accepted even though it should 
be rejected. This would mean rejecting a coefficient even though a relationship exists. Saunders et 
al. (2009) argue that the different errors are related to the significance levels that are used in the 
study. A commonly used significance level is 0.05 which infer that if the p-value is below 0.05 
there is 5% risk that a Type I error occurs. A lower significance level, i.e. 0.01, would decrease the 
risk of a Type I error but increase the risk of making a Type II error. In this study, the 
significance is denominated for the significance levels of 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), 0.10 (*).  
 
3.5.2 Normality 
The distribution of normal distributed standard errors is one of the main assumptions behind the 
OLS regression model. In Appendix 1, results from the Jarque-Bera test are supplied in order to 
test for non-normality. The null hypothesis of normality is rejected approximately half the time. 
Normality for the dependent variable, speed of adjustment, is not rejected. However, according 
to the central limit theorem, normality is not an issue when a sample is large enough 
(Wooldridge, 2009). A common, but yet disputed, approximation of a large sample used is that 
the number of observations is larger than 30. The number of observations in this sample is 85 
and is well above that number, thus the non-normal variables are not discarded. 
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3.5.3 Heteroskedasticity 
One of the assumptions of OLS estimation is that the variance of the explanatory variables’ error 
terms is constant (Wooldridge, 2009). The assumption of homoskedasticity is tested by 
conducting a Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test as well as a White test. The result of the Breusch-
Pagan-Godfrey test rejects the null of homoscedasticity. Also the White test shows signs of 
heteroskedasticity. As a remedy, White’s heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used 
throughout this study. Wooldridge (2009) argues that in large samples, as described in the central 
limit theorem, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors can be used whether heteroskedasticity 
exists or not. 
 
3.5.4 Nonlinearity 
Ramsey’s regression specification error tests (RESET) are conducted to control for functional 
form misspecifications. The RESET controls for important nonlinearities and the null is that the 
model is correctly specified (Wooldridge, 2009). No rejections of the null hypotheses are 
identified.  
 
3.5.5 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity occurs when the explanatory variables are highly correlated to each other 
(Brooks, 2008). Typically are explanatory variables correlated to some extent, but it is when this 
correlation is high there is risk for biased estimates. Multicollinearity can cause increased standard 
errors due to increased variance among some of the variables (Wooldridge, 2009). The threshold 
value for near multicollinearity use to be 0.8. However, multicollinearity is not a clear violation of 
the OLS assumptions, so common sense should be used to decide whether to discard a variable 
or not. 
 
Appendix 2, depicts a correlation matrix that is used to check for multicollinearity. The matrix 
shows that there is risk that can be a multicollinearity problem between the number of analyst 
and the stock turnover variables. Further, the number of analysts variable shows signs on being 
strongly correlated to the size variable (Ln(Assets)). Therefore the multivariate regression is also 
performed without the number of analyst variable. 
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3.6 Validity and Reliability 
Below follows a discussion regarding the validity and reliability of this study. Validity refers to 
how well the measures used in a study correspond with what you intended to investigate. That a 
study is reliable refers to whether its results are going to be the same if the study is to be 
repeated.   
 
This study uses a methodological framework influenced by several studies, foremost from the 
study made by Leary and Michaely (2011), which are two of the most prominent authors in the 
field of dividend policy. The dependent variable, speed of adjustment, is among researchers a 
commonly used measure on dividend smoothing and should thus be regarded as a suitable 
measure. Lately however, researchers like Brav et al. (2005) have questioned the partial 
adjustment model’s ability to capture dividend smoothing as managers no longer appear to target 
the payout ratio in same extent as earlier. As mentioned previously, also the omission of share 
repurchases has been questioned (e.g. Lambrecht and Myers, 2012). However, this paper targets 
the dividend smoothing factor as repurchasing of shares does not seem to be as common in 
Sweden as for example in the US. However, in this study share repurchases are controlled for 
using a dummy variable. Regarding the payout ratio, some approximation is needed since 
companies normally do not disclose what kind of target measure they have for dividends, if they 
have any. This study uses the median payout ratio (from the period observed) to depict the target 
payout ratio. This measure is prone to error, but as an approximation it has to be considered as 
reliable, and it is also the same measure as is used by Leary and Michaely (2011).  
 
Determinants of dividend smoothing is not as a widely explored subject as dividend smoothing 
itself and most likely, there are real world determinants left out from this study. However, those 
determinants explored in this study have proxies that have been used in several other studies and 
thus, they should also be trusted as valid.  
 
Regarding the reliability of this study, it is to be considered as high. While conducting this study, 
very reliable data sources have been used and the methodological approach has been followed 
closely. The study is also described thoroughly so any replication study would be possible. The 
exclusion of firms is motivated by the methodological restrictions to measure dividend 
smoothing, i.e. the companies must have paid dividends regularly and over a certain amount of 
time, otherwise it would be impossible to measure the dividend smoothing. The companies 
investigated comprises of all companies that meet these requirements in Sweden and thus, 
replicating studies should yield the same result.  
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4. RESULTS 
In this chapter the findings of the study are presented. The descriptive data and regression results are displayed 
using accompanying tables. 
 
4.1 Descriptive data 
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the speed of adjustment for all companies. The sample mean 
speed of adjustment is 0.392 and the sample median is 0.358. Worth noting is that companies 
listed on the large cap seem to have lower speed of adjustment on average. Also the median is 
lowest for the large cap sample. Surprisingly, small cap companies has lower mean and median 
than the mid cap companies. This makes it harder to distinguish any pattern between the 
different caps. 
 
Further, there is a wide range of values on the speed of adjustment, where values differ from 
close to zero to close to one. Financial companies3 provide both high and low values of speed of 
adjustment, however this group has the lowest speed of adjustment mean and median values, 
suggesting that financial firms smooth their dividends more than other firms. 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive data of speed of adjustment 
 Mean Median Max Min Std. dev. Sum 
Large Cap 0.337 0.290 0.983 0.006 0.270 44 
Mid Cap 0.456 0.430 0.998 0.021 0.262 22 
Small Cap 0.445 0.363 0.878 0.170 0.218 19 
All 0.392 0.358 0.998 0.006 0.261 85 
Financial Companies 0.303 0.199 0.983 0.006 0.268 23 
 
Descriptive data of firm median values of the explanatory variables collected during the sample 
period are presented in table 4.2, whereas the corresponding firm mean values are presented in 
table 4.3. To clarify, table 4.2 depict mean, median, maximum, and minimum values, as well as 
standard deviations of the medians of different firm specific characteristics. Table 4.3 depict the 
same descriptive data of the mean of different firm specific characteristics. 
  
                                                          
3 Financial companies include real estate companies, banks, private equity companies etcetera. The financial 
companies can be listed at any cap. 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive data of firm characteristics (Median values) 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
PPE to Assets 0.283 0.181 0.994 0.003 0.303 
Leverage 0.546 0.576 0.963 0.045 0.188 
Forecast dispersion 0.063 0.064 0.194 0.000 0.057 
Stock turnover 0.548 0.385 1.927 0.045 0.468 
Top 10 ownership (%)  0.532 0.526 0.878 0.181 0.174 
Return volatility 0.079 0.079 0.143 0.043 0.016 
Firm age 13.771 13.5 26 4 7.083 
Institutional holdings 0.492 0.502 0.854 0.049 0.182 
Market-to-book 1.590 1.213 6.183 0.562 1.043 
Ln(Assets) 15.752 16.015 21.944 11.067 2.221 
Payout ratio 0.476 0.473 1.000 0.106 0.204 
Repurchases 0.141 0 1 0 0.333 
Cash cow  0.071 0 1 0 0.258 
Cash to Assets 0.099 0.061 0.928 0.001 0.135 
Number of Analysts 7.482 4 28.5 0 8.087 
 
Table 4.3: Descriptive data of firm characteristics (Mean values) 
 
 Mean  Median Maximum Minimum  Std. Dev. 
PPE to Assets 0.271 0.195 0.989 0.003 0.275 
Leverage 0.551 0.583 0.962 0.064 0.179 
Forecast dispersion 0.085 0.081 0.329 0.000 0.070 
Stock turnover 0.608 0.409 2.979 0.046 0.537 
Top 10 ownership (%)  0.533 0.526 0.878 0.181 0.173 
Return volatility 0.085 0.084 0.158 0.049 0.018 
Firm age 13.95 13.50 25.5 4 7.17 
Institutional holdings 0.493 0.510 0.854 0.049 0.182 
Market-to-book 1.633 1.312 6.241 0.632 1.078 
Ln(Assets) 15.695 16.011 22.017 10.789 2.235 
Payout ratio 0.615 0.508 1.000 0.148 0.328 
Repurchases4 0.192 0.083 1 0 0.262 
Cash cow  0.082 0 1 0 0.277 
Cash to Assets 0.109 0.071 0.857 0.006 0.129 
Number of Analysts 7.177 4 25.667 0 7.312 
 
 
4.2 Regression results 
In tables 4.4 and 4.5 the regression output of this study is presented. The dependent variable for 
both tables is the speed of adjustment. In the regressions in Table 4.4, median values of firm 
specific characteristics are used to examine their causal effect on the speed of adjustment, where 
as in table 4.5 mean values are used for the same objective.  
 
                                                          
4
 A median value of 0.083 corresponds to a company that has been repurchasing shares 1/12 of the years. 
 
 
 
Table 4.4: Regression output from using median values 
*) Significant on the 10 % level.  
**) Significant on the 5 % level. 
***) Significant on the 1 % level. 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: Speed 
of adjustment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
PPE to Assets -0.295** -0.308*** -0.319*** -0.287*** -0.232** -0.279*** -0.296*** -0.259*** -0.275*** -0.244** -0.277*** -0.292*** -0.268*** -0.300*** 
Leverage 0.367* 0.386** 0.350** 0.289* 0.277* 0.265* 0.292* 0.271* 0.415*** 0.249* 0.269* 0.306** 0.284* 0.336** 
Forecast 
dispersion 
1.616** 1.646** 1.691*** 1.291** 0.925* 1.194** 1.275** 1.131** 1.562*** 1.133** 1.154** 0.989* 1.160** 1.457*** 
Stock turnover -0.160 -0.093 -0.132*            
Top 10 owners 
(%)  
-0.047 -0.002  0.133           
Return volatility 1.704 1.194   3.279*          
Firm age -0.002 -0.001    -0.007*         
Inst. holdings -0.191 -0.203     -0.201        
Market-to-book 0.000 0.019      0.022       
Ln(Assets) -0.035 -0.015       -0.037***      
Payout ratio 0.032 0.063        0.161     
Repurchases  0.007 -0.012         -0.008    
Cash cow -0.005 -0.059          -0.187*   
Cash to Assets -0.160 -0.141           0.063  
Number of 
Analysts 
0.009             -0.005 
C 0.752 0.430 0.257*** 0.164 -0.010 0.343*** 0.335*** 0.211** 0.734*** 0.177* 0.252*** 0.259*** 0.234** 0.242*** 
R- Square 0.299 0.287 0.210 0.181 0.211 0.207 0.192 0.181 0.250 0.189 0.174 0.206 0.175 0.194 
Adjusted R-
square 
0.146 0.144 0.170 0.140 0.171 0.167 0.152 0.141 0.212 0.148 0.133 0.166 0.134 0.153 
P-value (f-stat) 0.031 0.029 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.002 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: Regression output from using mean values 
*) Significant on the 10 % level.  
**) Significant on the 5 % level. 
***) Significant on the 1 % 
Dependent 
variable: Speed 
of adjustment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
PPE to Assets -0.335*** -0.341*** -0.288*** -0.279*** -0.236*** -0.273*** -0.293*** -0.260*** -0.280*** -0.303*** -0.294*** -0.308*** -0.270*** -0.287*** 
Leverage 0.456** 0.479** 0.377** 0.349** 0.353** 0.353** 0.368** 0.348** 0.505*** 0.357** 0.391** 0.392*** 0.358* 0.397** 
Forecast 
dispersion 
0.872* 0.898* 0.852** 0.761** 0.481 0.747** 0.837** 0.774** 1.006*** 0.836** 0.805*** 0.626** 0.758** 0.852** 
Stock turnover -0.071 -0.024 -0.034 
           
Top 10 owners 
(%)  
-0.137 -0.107 
 
0.020 
          
Return volatility 1.631 1.275 
  
3.201** 
         
Firm age -0.001 -0.001 
   
-0.006 
        
Inst. holdings -0.114 -0.120 
    
-0.173622 
       
Market-to-book 0.004 0.022 
     
0.025 
      
Ln(Assets) -0.032 -0.015 
      
-0.033** 
     
Payout ratio -0.069*** -0.068*** 
       
-0.049 
    
Repurchases  -0.069 -0.086 
        
-0.156 
   
Cash cow -0.126 -0.157 
         
-0.227*** 
  
Cash to Assets -0.157 -0.138 
          
0.052 
 
Number of 
Analysts 
0.008 
            
-0.003 
C 0.738 0.466 0.219** 0.208 -0.043 0.296*** 0.292*** 0.172* 0.623*** 0.245*** 0.227*** 0.234*** 0.207* 0.211** 
R- Square 0.311 0.303 0.165 0.162 0.204 0.186 0.176 0.172 0.220 0.179 0.185 0.217 0.162 0.168 
Adjusted R-
square 
0.162 0.163 0.124 0.120 0.164 0.145 0.134 0.131 0.181 0.138 0.144 0.178 0.120 0.127 
P-value (f-stat) 0.021 0.018 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.005 
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In tables 4.4 and 4.5, regression (1) represent the output for when all the identified regressors are 
used in the same regression. Regression (2) represent the output from all the regressors less the 
number of analysts variable since it is a risk that that variable causes multicollinearity. Regressions 
(1) and (2) consistently show significance for the PPE to assets, leverage and the forecast dispersion 
variables, whereas all the other variables are insignificant except from the dividend payout ratio, 
which is significant when average values are used. As for the rest of the regressions (3-12), the 
three significant variables, PPE to assets, leverage and forecast dispersion, act as control variables when 
the insignificant variables from regressions (1) and (2) are tested one at the time. From here on 
out, these tests are referred to as individual tests.  
 
The individual tests generate a few more significant coefficients. To start with, return volatility (5), 
Ln(Assets) (9) , and the cash cow (12) variables are significant both when using mean and median 
values. Further, the stock turnover (3) and firm age (6) variables are significant when median values 
are used. The payout ratio (10) variable is only significant when using firm averages and running 
the multivariate analysis, i.e. it is not significant in the individual test.  
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5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, the results and the different variables are discussed and analyzed in detail using previous research 
and theory as a base. 
 
Table 5.1: Coefficient comparisons: Expectations, outcomes, and previous studies 
 
Dividend smoothing seem to be apparent in Swedish public firms. According to the theory, a 
speed of adjustment between 0 and 1 indicate that dividend smoothing is apparent. The 
relationship between dividend smoothing and the speed of adjustment is inverse and in such high 
speed of adjustment is translated to a low degree of dividend smoothing. As can be read in table 
4.1, the sample mean in Swedish public firms is 0.392 and the median is 0.358. This speed of 
adjustment factor is higher than the speed of adjustment factor found in studies of American 
Proxy 
 
Theory Expected 
sign 
Actual Sign: 
Median 
Actual Sign: 
Mean 
Leary and 
Michaely 
(2011) 
findings 
Jeong 
(2013) 
findings 
PPE to Assets (1) + –*** –*** – 
 Leverage (2) + +*** +*** 
  Forecast dispersion (1) – +*** +*** + 
 Stock turnover (1) – –* – + 
 Top 10 owners (%)  (2) + inconclusive (+)A inconclusive (+) 
 
– 
Return volatility (1) – +* +** + 
 Firm age (1) + –* – – 0 
Institutional holdings  (1) + – – – 
 
 
(2) – – – – 
 
 
(3) + – – – 
  (3) – – – –  
Market-to-book   (1) – + + + 
 
 
(2) + + + + 
 Ln(Assets) (1) + –*** –** – – 
Payout ratioB  – + –*** – 
 Repurchases 
(Dummy) 
 
– inconclusive (–) – – 
 Cash cow (2) – -* –*** – 
 Cash to Assets (2) – inconclusive (+) inconclusive (+) 
 
+ 
Number of Analysts (1) + inconclusive (–) inconclusive (–) – 
 (1) Information asymmetry     
(2) Agency theory 
(3) Investor clientele 
A) The sign in parentheses represent the sign in the individual regression analysis. 
B) Payout ratio only significant in the multivariate regression analysis. 
*) Significant on the 10 % level.  
**) Significant on the 5 % level. 
***) Significant on the 1 % level. 
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firms, but lower speed of adjustment than East Asian firms5.  
 
It is difficult to speculate about what kind of reasons that lies behind these international 
differences. La Porta et al. (2000) suggest that legal origins might matter. We argued that dividend 
frequency might matter, but since Hong Kong firms have a higher speed of adjustment as well as 
higher dividend frequency than Swedish firms, this seems hard to support.  
 
In table 5.1, the results of the study are compared to the theoretical expectations as well as the 
results from the studies made by Leary and Michaely (2011) and Jeong (2013). The independent 
variables serve as proxies for the different market frictions, namely information asymmetry (1), 
agency issues (2) and investor clientele (3). Coefficient signs of firm characteristics, with regards 
to the speed of adjustment, are presented from using both the median and mean values. The 
actual sign is the same whether median or mean values are used, except for one variable, namely 
the payout ratio. The consistency brings credibility to this study. 
 
Firm maturity 
As highlighted in table 4.1, larger firms (firms on the large cap) appear to be smoothing their 
dividends to a greater extent than other companies. This is a result that is in line with both Leary 
and Michaely (2011) and Jeong (2013). As Leary and Michaely (2011) argue, being a large firm 
most often indicates that the firm also is older on average. It can also be assumed that on 
average, firms on the large cap are more mature than firms on the mid- and small caps. Older and 
larger firms are then relatively more well-known according to Leary and Michaely (2011) which 
should result in less information asymmetry between management and investors.  
 
Starting by looking at firm age in table 5.1, the expected sign is positive since a higher firm age is 
expected to bring less information asymmetry and thus less dividend smoothing is needed. The 
actual sign however were in both cases negative, with the median showing a significance level of 
10 percent. While the significance is quite low, the actual sign is aligned with Leary and 
Michaely’s (2011) findings. This suggests that on the Swedish stock exchange, firms that are older 
seem to smooth more. As for firm size, represented by the natural logarithm of assets, the 
expected sign is the same as for firm age, but again the actual sign, both for mean and median 
                                                          
5 Chemmanur et al. (2010) found a mean (median) of 0.279 (0.058) for American firms and 0.684 (0.678) for Hong 
Kong firms. Leary and Michaely (2011) found a mean (median) of 0.14 (0.11) for US firms. Andres et al. (2009) find 
a speed of adjustment coefficient for German firm ranging between 0.21-0.49 depending on method used, however, 
this study is not really comparable since it regresses all the firms altogether and not individually. Jeong (2013) 
demonstrates a speed of adjustment mean of 0.689 for Korean firms. 
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values, is negative. In the individual tests, this variable showcases a significance level of 1 percent 
for median values and 5 percent for mean values. The interpretation is that larger firms smooth 
more, and not less as the information asymmetry theory would suggest.  
 
Overall, firm maturity on the Swedish stock exchange seems to be negatively correlated with the 
speed of adjustment. It is not just that firm maturity does not have an impact on smoothing, but 
it has an opposite impact of what signaling and information asymmetry theory would suggest. 
This goes against the findings of Chemmanur et al. (2010) on dividend smoothing where 
information asymmetry, and thus signaling, seems to be an important determinant of the degree 
of smoothing. However, our findings are in line with the studies of Leary and Michaely (2011) as 
well as Jeong (2013), which supports the negative impact of firm maturity on speed of 
adjustment. 
  
Growth opportunities 
Growth opportunities is estimated as the market-to-book ratio, and from an information 
asymmetry perspective, a higher market-to-book ratio points towards a higher degree of 
information asymmetry. This is due to that the larger the discrepancy between market- and book 
value, the more growth opportunities the firm can be assumed to have. This means that the 
expected sign is going to be negative; a higher market-to-book ratio should generate a lower 
speed of adjustment since more smoothing is needed to mitigate the costs of asymmetric 
information. While the actual signs are insignificant, they are positive which once again is in line 
with what Leary and Michaely (2011) found regarding growth opportunities and their impact on 
the speed of adjustment. This could be an indication of that once again the signaling theory 
regarding dividends does not hold up on for Swedish firms.  
 
The market-to-book ratio is also used as a proxy for agency costs of excess cash. The more 
growth opportunities, i.e. higher ratio, the less the amount of excess cash the firm is believed to 
be holding and thus the smaller the agency costs are. Thus, from an agency point of view, the 
market-to-book ratio is expected to be positively correlated with the speed of adjustment. 
Looking at table 5.1, in line with Leary and Michaely (2011), the expected and actual values of the 
speed of adjustment are positive. Once again it should be stressed that the coefficient of market-
to-book ratio is not significantly different from zero.  
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Asset tangibility 
In accordance with Leary and Michaely’s (2011) study, PPE-to-total assets are used to represent 
asset tangibility which is a proxy for information asymmetry. Compared to intangible assets, 
tangible assets should, due to their nature, be easier to value for investors. Thus, the information 
asymmetry is expected to be lower for firms with a high degree of asset tangibility and therefore 
the degree of dividend smoothing is expected to be negative. This means that the coefficient 
should be positively correlated with the speed of adjustment. As presented in table 5.1, the value 
of the coefficient in relation to the speed of adjustment is actually negative, both when using 
mean and median values. It is also worth noting that this value is significant on the 1 percent 
level, which strengthens the confidence in the result. The results show that when the tangibility 
of assets is high, then the speed of adjustment is low meaning that these firms smooth their 
dividends more than firms with a lower relative amount of tangible assets. Just like with the 
previous proxies for information asymmetry, this shows an opposite relationship with the speed 
of adjustment than what can be expected from relevant theory. These findings are again in line 
with Leary and Michaely’s (2011) results. They also find a significant negative relationship, 
indicating that firms with less information asymmetry problems smooth more, and not the other 
way around.  
 
Risk 
Risk is represented by the variable return volatility; the volatility of the firm’s stock returns. 
Having a greater volatility in the returns results in more asymmetric information and investor 
uncertainty and therefore it is expected that the sign of the coefficient to be negative. With a 
significance level of 10 percent and 5 percent respectively in the individual tests for the median 
and mean values, the return volatility coefficient has a positive impact on the speed of 
adjustment. Once again the information asymmetry theories of dividends can be discarded for 
Swedish firms as having more risky returns actually equal a higher speed of adjustment of the 
dividends. Leary and Michaely (2011) get the same finding regarding the riskiness of US firms. 
One could argue that larger firms with less growth opportunities have less risk than smaller firms 
with more growth opportunities and thus, these results are also in line with this study’s previous 
findings. 
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Analyst coverage 
The asymmetry in information between inside and outside investors in a firm is represented by 
analyst coverage. In line with Leary and Michaely (2011) this is measured as the difference in 
analysts’ forecasts, and the higher the difference, the larger the information asymmetry between 
inside and outside investors. It is expected that the dispersion of forecasts will be negatively 
related to the speed of adjustment as more smoothing would be needed to mitigate higher 
information asymmetry costs. As indicated in table 5.1, the actual sign of the dispersion of 
forecasts coefficient was positive on a 1 percent significance level. This suggests that the 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts is actually positively correlated with the speed of adjustment and 
thus lower dividend smoothing. This result is in line with Leary and Michaely (2011) who derive 
the same result regarding dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. 
 
Another variable that is used to represent this information gap is the number of analysts. The 
rationale is that the more analysts that cover the firm, the less information asymmetry between 
inside and outside investors. After running the regressions, the actual sign on the coefficient is 
negative, although inconclusive, meaning that the univariate and the multivariate regressions 
show different signs for the coefficient. Leary and Michaely (2011) uses the same variable and 
find a negative coefficient as well.   
 
Investment horizon 
Investment horizon is another proxy for information asymmetry and is represented by stock 
turnover. Lower stock turnover means that the investment horizon is longer which according to 
Guttman et al. (2010) should equal lower information asymmetry. Therefore, the expected sign 
on the coefficient in relation to the speed of adjustment is negative, indicating a greater need for 
dividend smoothing. Table 5.1 shows that the actual coefficient is negative, with a 10 percent 
significance when using median values. This is the first proxy for information asymmetry that 
actually is in line with the relevant theory. Of course, a higher significance level would strengthen 
the reliance in the variables impact on the speed of adjustment, but nonetheless, it shows that in 
some respect a longer investment horizon results in more dividend smoothing. Leary and 
Michaely (2011) also use this proxy for asymmetric information and they get the opposite result; 
that a longer investment horizon results in less smoothing, which is in line with the results of the 
other information asymmetry proxies. 
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Institutional holdings 
Institutional holding, or ownership, is a proxy for all three market frictions; asymmetric 
information, agency costs, and taxes (and clientele effects). Starting off with information 
asymmetry, the expected relationship between institutional holdings and the speed of adjustment 
is positive, meaning lower dividend smoothing. This is because institutions are expected to lower 
any information asymmetry as they gather information much better than individual investors 
(Allen et al., 1999). While not significant, the results however, indicate that the degree of 
institutional ownership is negatively correlated with the speed of adjustment. 
  
From an agency point of view, the expected sign of the variable relative the speed of adjustment 
is negative, due to institutions abilities regarding monitoring and thus mitigating managerial 
misbehavior. By utilizing more smoothing, a firm can attract institutions to continue be owners 
due to their tax advantage on dividends relative retail investors (Allen et al., 1999). The results, 
albeit insignificant, points towards an agency explanation of dividend smoothing with regards to 
institutional ownership. However, as previously mentioned, there are studies like Brav et al. 
(2005) that conclude that firms rarely use dividends to attract institutions as institutions 
themselves do not crave dividends more than capital gains (or repurchases). 
  
The clientele motivation of dividend smoothing with regards to institutional ownership has two 
opposing arguments. Firstly, since institutions are at a tax advantage regarding dividends, they 
would prefer them over capital gains relative individual investors and hence higher institutional 
ownership should result in a lower speed of adjustment and thus a higher degree of smoothing. It 
should be noted that during this time period in Sweden, dividends and capital gains were taxed at 
the same rate (30 percent), which in turn from a purely economic standpoint should make 
individual investors indifferent between dividends and capital gains. However, like many 
researchers point out, investors often prefer dividends as it is considered certain whereas a future 
capital gain is uncertain, and thus under the same tax rates would prefer dividends. Although 
institutions still had a relative tax advantage, it could be argued that individual investors also 
preferred dividends. Thus, this explanation of attracting institutions by paying and smoothing 
dividends might not be as strong in Sweden compared to countries like the US where dividends 
were taxed more heavily6 than capital gains for individual investors. 
                                                          
6
 See Ernst and Young (2012). 
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Secondly, due to tax planning and loss aversion for individual investors, they would prefer 
dividend smoothing and thus it is expected that firms with less institutional holding (and more 
individual holding) would smooth more.  
 
In line with Leary and Michaely (2011), the coefficient of institutional holding is in relation to the 
speed of adjustment negative. However, in this study this coefficient is insignificant, but the 
consistency with the study of Leary and Michaely (2011) can point in the direction of that the tax 
advantage of institutional companies has an effect on dividend smoothing 
 
Cash Cow   
As it has already been established that larger firms with less growth opportunities and less risk 
smooth their dividends more than firms with the opposite attributes, being a cash cow should 
then also result in a higher degree of smoothing. What is referred to as a cash cow in this study is 
mentioned in chapter 3, and it indicates higher amounts of excess cash. Therefore, the expected 
sign of the cash cow coefficient in table 5.1 is negative, and the actual sign is also negative, with a 
1 percent significance when using median values and a 10 percent significance when using mean 
values. This is in accordance with theories explaining agency costs of free cash flow like Jensen 
(1986) and the result is in line with studies like Leary and Michaely (2011). 
  
Ownership concentration 
Agency costs also use the proxy ownership concentration, represented by the ownership stake of 
the top 10 owners. Due to monitoring issues, Jeong (2013) argue that firms that are more closely 
held do not have as concerning agency costs as firms with more dispersed ownership. Therefore 
the expected relationship between concentration of ownership and the speed of adjustment is 
positive, meaning less dividend smoothing. The results suggest that this relationship is positive, 
when making the individual tests. However, this contradicts the results of Jeong (2013) that 
actually found a negative relationship. However, as these results are insignificant as presented in 
table 5.1, no major conclusions can be drawn from the level of concentration in ownership in a 
firm and its implication on how a firm decides its dividend policy and smoothing practices. 
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Financial slack 
Having financial slack could be considered equivalent to having excess cash, which in turn 
increases agency costs. Thus it is expected that there exists a negative relationship between 
financial slack and the speed of adjustment. The results from the regressions suggest that this 
relationship is instead positive, indicating that financial slack has a negative effect on dividend 
smoothing. However the results are not significant and are also inconclusive, so nothing can be 
said regarding this relationship. Leary and Michaely (2011) do not include this in their study, but 
Jeong (2013) does and finds a positive relationship as well. 
 
Leverage 
This is another variable used as a proxy for agency costs as more leverage should indicate lower 
agency costs as managers are monitored and constrained by debt. Thus the expected relationship 
between leverage and the speed of adjustment is the opposite of that with financial slack, namely 
a positive relationship. In line with Aivazian et al. (2006), the results presented in table 5.1 show 
that there indeed exists a positive relationship, and this is at a 1 percent significance level, 
indicating that more debt means less dividend smoothing. This is in line with the general theories 
on agency costs and the constraining ability of debt on a firm’s managers. This variable is not 
included in the studies of Leary and Michaely (2011) or Jeong (2013) for example, but it still 
shows that debt has an effect on dividend policy and smoothing. 
 
Repurchases 
Leary and Michaely (2011) conclude that repurchasing firms smooth more and thus similarly, 
Swedish firms who repurchase shares are expected to have a lower speed of adjustment with 
regards to their dividends. When looking at the results when using median values, the result is 
negative but inconclusive and it is negative without being significant when using mean values. 
This does not give much evidence if there is a positive or a negative relationship and besides, 
share repurchases during this time period for Swedish firms were not conducted in any greater 
extent. However, since the signs in the individual tests are negative, the possibility that 
repurchasing firms distribute their unexpected excess cash through repurchases should not be left 
out.  
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Dividend level 
In line with the assumptions of Leary and Michaely (2011), the dividend level, or the payout ratio 
of a firm, is expected to have a positive relationship with the degree of dividend smoothing. The 
actual signs are mostly insignificant, but significant in the multivariate analysis when using mean 
values. The fact that this variable is insignificant in the individual test, and also demonstrates 
different signs when using mean and median values, points to biases in the variable. Further 
analysis is therefore refrained.  
 
Summary of discussion 
The results of this study tend to support the agency theory explanation of dividend smoothing. 
As described in table 5.1, five out of six proxies for agency theory are in line with the expected 
sign. Two of these five variables are proven to be significant, but all of these variables show the 
same sign as the study of Leary and Michaely (2011). The only variable not agreeing with agency 
theory was the cash to assets variable (which was insignificant), but other proxies like the market-
to-book ratio and cash cow (very significant) show that being cash rich actually result in a lower 
speed of adjustment of dividends and thus more dividend smoothing. 
 
Regarding information asymmetry, most of our findings are in line with Leary and Michaely 
(2011) and Jeong (2013), which contradicts an information asymmetry explanation. One of nine 
proxies, the stock turnover variable, is supporting the asymmetric information explanation. The 
negative coefficient of stock turnover goes against the finding in Leary and Michaely (2011). 
Except for stock turnover, all other information asymmetry variables are in line with the results 
of Leary and Michaely (2011) and Jeong (2013). Thus, these findings suggest that firms with low 
information asymmetry are actually smoothing their dividends to a higher degree than companies 
with high information asymmetry.  
 
The proxy used for clientele effects, institutional holding, show no support for Leary and 
Michaely’s (2011) initial theory that individuals would use dividends as a mean for tax planning 
and thus indicate a higher degree of smoothing, something they also later rejected. This study 
finds that the tax advantage of dividends for institutions could be seen as a tax clientele effect as 
firms with higher institutional holding smooth more; catering to institutions preferences. 
 
Regarding the effect of share repurchases, insignificant results are pointing in the expected 
direction that share repurchasing firms tend to smooth their dividends more. Thus, it can be  
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argued that firms that repurchase shares distribute their unexpected excess cash through share 
repurchases. 
 
When comparing variables that represent both agency based- and information asymmetry based 
explanations (market-to-book and institutional holding), the result support the agency 
explanation over information asymmetry. Further, even though not all variables are significant, 
those that are the most significant either support agency costs explanations or strongly disprove 
the other explanations. This further indicates that agency issues plays a much more central role in 
dividend smoothing than does asymmetric information problems.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
Here, a summary of the findings is presented and conclusions are drawn. Lastly, suggestions for further research are 
also presented 
This study’s purpose was to identify whether dividend smoothing is a pertinent phenomenon in 
Swedish public firms and if so, identify what characteristics that drive this dividend smoothing. 
To answer this, three questions were asked.  
 
The first question asked how extensive the use of dividend smoothing is among Swedish public 
firms. To answer this question, a definition of dividend smoothing was needed. In line with many 
other studies, interpretation of dividend smoothing was made through Lintner’s partial 
adjustment model, where dividend smoothing corresponds negatively to the speed of adjustment. 
The findings show that Swedish public firms smooth their dividends, albeit to a lesser extent than 
companies in the US, but to a greater extent than companies in East Asia. Further, the results 
show that companies on Large cap are more likely to smooth their dividends than other 
companies.  
 
The second and third research questions that this paper was to answer were whether any 
determinants of dividend smoothing could be identified and how these findings correspond to 
similar studies. To answer this question a theoretical framework of information asymmetry-, 
agency-, and tax clientele based explanations were provided. The findings show support for 
agency based explanations with regards to dividend smoothing and little support for the other 
two. Dividend smoothing is found to be more likely to occur when companies have; high asset 
tangibility, low leverage, when the forecast dispersion among analysts is low (low information 
asymmetry), low stock return volatility, when companies are large, and when companies are 
considered to be cash cows. These findings are in line with similar studies like Leary and Michaely 
(2011) and Jeong (2013). Some variables used as proxies for the different explanations were not 
statistically significant, however, the observed sign of the coefficient of different determinants of 
dividend smoothing corresponded to a high degree with international studies. This might suggest 
that there are only minor differences internationally regarding determinants of dividend 
smoothing, however, as noted above, the degree of dividend smoothing is varying between 
different countries. 
 
 
  
49 
 
6.1 Further research 
Even though news about dividend payments often get a lot of attention in the media, there is 
often an information gap for investors of why certain dividend decisions are made. We believe it 
is important for market participants to get a better understanding of firms’ dividend policy, why 
certain firms behave the way they do in terms of dividend policy in general dividend smoothing 
in particular. Our results suggests that dividend smoothing is conducted to mitigate agency issues, 
but we believe that there still are aspects to be uncovered. Therefore we feel that further research 
is needed in this field of research. 
 
For example, the Swedish population of available companies to derive dividend smoothing from 
was quite scarce, and might have impacted our results. To get a larger sample a study might 
investigate similar countries, such as other Scandinavian countries, in order to get more 
significant results. This could potentially further strengthen the results of this study. 
 
Due to the obvious knowledge gap regarding international differences in the degree of dividend 
smoothing, further research within this subject is desired. Many studies have made international 
comparisons, but current research have been using two, or a few, countries to conduct these 
comparisons. Since we have concluded that firm level determinants are quite similar across 
borders, it could be wise to instead involve possible determinants on a national level to 
understand why the level of smoothing seems to be so different. Therefore it is recommended to 
make a comprehensive comparison between a large set of countries in order to capture national 
level determinants.  
 
This study did not address any differences between different industries. Regarding firm level 
determinants, it might be interesting to target differences in dividend smoothing between 
industries, as they might have different characteristics that might influence their dividend 
smoothing. Further, should in the future repurchases become more common in Sweden, then we 
recommend a study similar to ours that includes share repurchases and thus targets smoothing of 
the total payout ratio. 
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8. APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Jarque-Bera Test 
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Appendix 2: Correlation matrix, example of median values 
 
              
Sample: 1 85               
Included observations: 85              
Correlation               
Probability 
Speed of 
Adjustment  
Stock 
turnover  
Top 10 
owners (%)  
Return 
volatility  
PPE to 
Assets 
Forecast 
dispersion  Firm age 
Market-to-
book Ln(Assets)  Payout ratio  
Repurchases 
(dummy) Cash cow  
Cash to 
Assets 
Number of 
Analysts  
Institutional 
Holdings. 
Speed of Adjustment  1.000000               
 -----                
                
Stock turnover  0.069786 1.000000              
 0.5257 -----               
                
Top 10 ownership (%)  -0.077572 -0.560263 1.000000             
 0.4804 0.0000 -----              
                
Return volatility  0.288358 -0.001079 0.056143 1.000000            
 0.0074 0.9922 0.6098 -----             
                
PPE to Assets -0.224197 -0.042644 0.029573 -0.190457 1.000000           
 0.0391 0.6984 0.7882 0.0808 -----            
                
Forecast dispersion  0.229477 0.522178 -0.356884 0.169152 0.270411 1.000000          
 0.0346 0.0000 0.0008 0.1217 0.0123 -----           
                
Firm age -0.167362 0.281836 -0.299985 -0.175375 -0.008474 0.040095 1.000000         
 0.1258 0.0090 0.0053 0.1084 0.9386 0.7156 -----          
                
Market-to-book 0.140481 0.146210 0.048292 0.146168 -0.210520 -0.012694 -0.245204 1.000000        
 0.1997 0.1818 0.6607 0.1819 0.0531 0.9082 0.0237 -----         
                
Ln(Assets)  -0.097538 0.546791 -0.493689 -0.358153 0.127138 0.391567 0.481736 -0.275745 1.000000       
 0.3745 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.2462 0.0002 0.0000 0.0106 -----        
                
Payout ratio  0.213323 0.054624 0.024514 0.072559 -0.272414 -0.010791 -0.158148 0.397668 -0.262896 1.000000      
 0.0500 0.6195 0.8238 0.5093 0.0117 0.9219 0.1483 0.0002 0.0151 -----       
                
Repurchases  0.047169 -0.053958 -0.105029 -0.155920 -0.075972 0.032218 -0.044169 0.011357 0.099180 -0.056787 1.000000     
 0.6682 0.6238 0.3388 0.1542 0.4895 0.7697 0.6881 0.9178 0.3665 0.6057 -----      
                
Cash cow  -0.160242 -0.002077 -0.051990 -0.261967 -0.136149 -0.173293 0.237290 -0.012408 0.380769 -0.161643 0.090639 1.000000    
 0.1429 0.9849 0.6365 0.0154 0.2141 0.1127 0.0288 0.9103 0.0003 0.1394 0.4094 -----     
                
Cash to Assets -0.006429 -0.084774 0.145343 0.006922 -0.346501 -0.241898 -0.094509 0.365317 -0.366254 0.275056 0.010649 -0.076452 1.000000   
 0.9534 0.4405 0.1844 0.9499 0.0012 0.0257 0.3896 0.0006 0.0006 0.0108 0.9229 0.4868 -----    
                
Number of Analysts  0.078541 0.798378 -0.447713 -0.211028 -0.016275 0.448506 0.324364 0.198553 0.689693 0.105947 -0.049927 0.052027 -0.079655 1.000000  
 0.4749 0.0000 0.0000 0.0525 0.8825 0.0000 0.0025 0.0685 0.0000 0.3345 0.6500 0.6363 0.4687 -----   
                
Institutional Holdings -0.019385 0.125446 0.217673 -0.009686 -0.095815 0.187991 0.018253 0.111136 0.172943 0.023497 -0.072101 0.212905 -0.266337 0.164825 1.000000 
 
